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the latter. One reason is simply that, despite the current popularity of social history, the moral formation of the early Christian movement remains virtually unexplored in comparison with the venerable tradition of histories of its theological ideas. More important, this is a choice about what constitutes an adequate description of people's morals. I believe that we cannot claim to understand the morality of a group until we can describe the world of meaning and of relationships, special to that group in its own time and place, within which behavior is evaluated. The moral admonition I remember as most frequent in my childhood was simply "Behave yourself!" Although this phrase seems on its face semantically empty, parents in my neighborhood universally assumed its effectiveness. The use of such a command or plea takes for granted that one knows what behavior is expected. When Paul exhorts recent converts "to walk worthily of the God who called you into his own kingdom and glory" (1 Thess 2:12), the appeal is more elaborate, but not much more precise. In both cases the persons addressed must have learned what is proper, what is worthy. It is this shaping of moral knowledge, sensibility, and intuition-the necessary ground and context of all specific moral discourse-which usually runs through our defining sieves. Hence, I propose that we focus our historical inquiry on the moral formation of communities.
The third choice I propose is to try to understand rather than to explain the moral universe of the first Christian groups. By that I mean to consider the early Christian movement as a cultural entity and to adopt that mode of cultural analysis, Weberian in its roots, which construes culture as a system of communication. Accordingly, the task of the investigator is to understand this system for itself, as one would try to understand a foreign language, rather than to reduce it to the results or mask of something else.2 Of course, that does not mean that the student of culture will ignore those ways in which the cultural system is connected with the material and structural aspects of the society, nor the roles that masking and indirection play in every human mode of communication. The point is that all these factors are to be understood as part of a system of meaning. For example, the economic factor: money is money only by means of social conventions. It is of cultural significance insofar as "money talks."
In order to understand the subculture of the early Christians, what we have to do is not to abstract from it their ideas, ideals, or principles, nor to divine some mysterious inner world behind their world of symbolstheir feelings, attitudes, dispositions, or self-understanding. Rather, we ask how their symbolic universe worked. The culture of people does not only express who they are; it is constitutive of who they are. We become members of a community by the same process by which we become selves, and that is a cultural, communicative process.3
The model I suggest for the historian of early Christian morality is thus not the jelly maker or distiller, but the detective. What we must do with the scattered fragments of evidence we glean from our sources is not to boil them down to obtain their essence, however we might define thatthe code of moral rules, the moral principles, the logic of ethical argument, the ideals and goals of moral perfection. Rather, we must reconstruct, must imagine the world in which these fragments made sense-like Eco's William of Baskerville, from tracks in the snow and running monks deducing the abbot's runaway horse named Brunellus. Like him, more problematically, we must divine from the world as known the labyrinth in the subcultural microcosm, from the labyrinth an imagined world, from the imagined world the springs of action.4 Like Baskerville's, our reconstructed worlds will almost certainly be mistaken in many particulars, and the mistakes may have unforeseen consequences. Such flaws belong to the nature of history and to the human condition; they do not negate the importance of the quest.
It will by now be obvious that the approach I am proposing is not novel. The , is an impressive attempt to combine the insights of precisely the kind of sociology of knowledge I am talking about with literary-critical (semiotic) studies of narrative. The result of the combination, however, is an ambiguity of central categories that is more confusing than helpful. Is the "sociology of Paul's narrative world" simply an analysis of the social context that enables the story implied by the letter to work as fiction, or is it the description of a "real" world, in which this letter of Paul is only one of a large number of factors that will affect the way a Philemon who is not only a character in Paul's story will act? If the former, then the reader can supply whatever ending seems right ("the lady or the tiger?"), and Petersen's elaborate analysis has nothing at all to do with early Christian ethics. If the latter, then we need to know more It is fairly easy to list steps by which we could begin to explore the culture of early Christian ethics. Alas, the list entails a range of research too vast for any individual to accomplish. Nevertheless, it may be useful to indicate some areas in which pertinent work is already at hand and some others in which our ignorance is nearly total, yet corrigible.
We know that the Christian communities of the first century did not exist in a vacuum, even though they often seem to do so in our books about them. The first Christians had to deal with their cousins and inlaws in their villages, and the concern for honor or shame of their extended families was as much a part of their world as the smell of the village dung heap. Such ties were weaker in the cities, no doubt, but one has only to consider the plan of residential streets excavated in places like Dura Europos or Ostia or Delos to see that most people, living in small spaces chockablock with their neighbors, would not have much choice about sharing those neighbors' world, metaphorically as well as physically.
Understanding the ethics of the early Christians must therefore begin with a rigorous attempt to describe the ethos of the larger culture-with its various local permutations-within which the Christian movement began and spread. What we would like to know, if it were possible, is what every morally competent person then knew simply by being part of that culture.
I propose that we begin by distinguishing between "great traditions" and "little traditions." By the great traditions, I mean primarily those which are borne by corpora of literature, by more or less definite "canons." For our purposes, it will be important to consider both the great traditions of Greece and Rome, which can for the period of the principate be lumped together, and the great traditions of Israel. In both cases, although the historical development of each tradition is important for understanding it, we are focally interested in the shape that the tradition had attained in the early Roman Empire. Practically, it is Plato as read by Philo and Plutarch, not Plato as read by, say, W. Jaeger, whom we must understand. So, too, it is neither the Isaiah of the eighth century nor the Isaiah of B. Duhm or G. von Rad, but the Isaiah of the Qumran pesher that is closest to our subject.
We There is another reason why we need not despair of the task of describing popular morality in the world of early Christianity, nor even wait until that task is complete before we proceed with our inquiry into the Christian ethos itself. Several years ago the Roman historian E. A. Judge observed that, while the social history of the principate and especially of the eastern provinces had been largely neglected, there were many things about the early Christian movement and the documents it has preserved that make it a good case study around which to organize such a social history.'6 Similarly, one could argue that Christianity, as a special case within the larger culture of the Greco-Roman world, is an excellent starting point for investigating popular morality. Although the documents that are our primary sources for early Christian history were written by those whom we could call the elite of the church, most of them were by no means to be counted among the elite of the "great traditions," and the documents are therefore representative of a segment of the society other than that of the high culture. Thus, those documents, along with many of those produced by other groups of Jews in the same era, provide one quite exceptional body of evidence from people of social levels ordinarily voiceless in the surviving literature of antiquity. Our study of early Christian ethos and ethics may therefore make some contribution toward a more general description of everyday morality in the Roman provinces.
Proceeding thus by successively smaller concentric circles of culture, we come finally to our central question, How can we effectively go about describing the ethos and ethics of the emergent Christian movement itself? First, we need to gather the scattered but not negligible information that we have about the social structure of each of the various forms of the early Christian movement, and to see how far we can go in correlating them with specific constellations in the symbolic universe exhibited by our sources. I have in mind something like Gerd Theissen's observations about the "socioecology" of different missionary strategies, although his implicit biological 15 Certain aspects of Dover's project, however, may serve as a cautionary example against our perhaps inescapable tendency to assume that the definition of morality at home in our own social world is, unlike all the others, not historically contingent but culturally neutral. Thus, the conception of morality that he assumes throughout, and which, partly by virtue of his lucid style, seems so perfectly commonsensical, is none other than that "emotivism" which Maclntyre has so devastatingly criticized as the embodiment of a peculiarly narrow and special academic subculture (After Virtue, chaps. 2 and 3). to analyze the logic of the interactive world that Paul and his readers shared, the meaningful structure of the process in which they were engaged before and after the writing of the letter.20 That is what I mean by "the grammar of morals," and it should be clear that in using this metaphor I do not have in mind the old-fashioned grammar book which consisted of neatly organized sets of rules. Just as modern linguists debate whether it is even theoretically possible to capture in the form of rules the complex nuances of a natural language which the competent native speaker knows intuitively, so we may doubt whether that is the best way to describe the direction and texture of a community's moral formation.
Finally, a "cultural-linguistic" inquiry may help us to escape the temptation to think that only what is unusual or unique about the Christian moral universe is important. The "essence" of Christianity is not some residue that remains after we have boiled away everything they "borrowed" from the impure world around them. The linguistic model of culture helps us to see how silly such a notion is, for it would be like saying that the real language of a first-generation immigrant to America consisted only of those special expressions coined in the ethnic community, excluding all words 
